<p>This paper comprises replies to three symposium papers that approach my work from broadly Hegelian or so-called continental perspectives: Estrada-González (<CitationRef CitationID="CR3">2024</CitationRef>), Ficara (<CitationRef CitationID="CR4">2024</CitationRef>), and Shores (<CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2023</CitationRef>). The goal is not to settle exegetical questions about Hegel but to clarify how a subclassical—in particular, glut-theoretic (and, if relevant, gap-theoretic)—framework interacts with speculative and continental treatments of contradiction and negation. Each main section may be read independently, though together they emphasize the same theme: Logic, as the sparse and topic-neutral closure relation (here taken to be FDE) on all true theories, remains distinct from the richer, extralogical theorizing that particular programs—including Hegelian and continental ones—may require. I am deeply honored by the work of each author and grateful for the engagement.</p>

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On Hegel and the continental tradition: responses to Estrada-González, Ficara, and Shores

  • Jc Beall

摘要

This paper comprises replies to three symposium papers that approach my work from broadly Hegelian or so-called continental perspectives: Estrada-González (2024), Ficara (2024), and Shores (2023). The goal is not to settle exegetical questions about Hegel but to clarify how a subclassical—in particular, glut-theoretic (and, if relevant, gap-theoretic)—framework interacts with speculative and continental treatments of contradiction and negation. Each main section may be read independently, though together they emphasize the same theme: Logic, as the sparse and topic-neutral closure relation (here taken to be FDE) on all true theories, remains distinct from the richer, extralogical theorizing that particular programs—including Hegelian and continental ones—may require. I am deeply honored by the work of each author and grateful for the engagement.