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<p>The recent literature has witnessed a somewhat surprising development in the Western understanding of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Buddhism: it has been argued that the full-blown PSR — the principle according to which everything has a reason for its existence — is at work in Nāgārjuna’s <i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</i> (<i>MMK</i>). This is surprising because the PSR is commonly taken to be the hallmark of rationalism, whereas Nāgārjuna is not typically associated with a rationalist tradition. Indeed, it is not uncommon even to take Nāgārjuna as advancing a radical kind of anti-rationalism. One means by which we might resist this conclusion is by establishing that although for Nāgārjuna everything has a reason, it is <i>not</i> the case that everything has a sufficient reason. Evidence for such a view might be found in Nāgārjuna’s anti-foundationalist metaphysic. I argue that although promising, appeal to Nāgārjuna’s anti-foundationalism does not secure the means by which we can deny that the metaphysic of the <i>MMK</i> validates the truth of the PSR. In spite of this negative conclusion, however, much of value is learned along the way. In particular, I argue that what is at issue between the PSR-embracer and the PSR-detractor (of a certain stripe, at least) is not the PSR itself but an ancillary principle that connects reasons with sufficient reasons.</p>

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Nāgārjuna, PSR, and Madhyamaka anti-foundationalism

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    2026年2月17日

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  • Ricki Bliss

摘要

The recent literature has witnessed a somewhat surprising development in the Western understanding of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Buddhism: it has been argued that the full-blown PSR — the principle according to which everything has a reason for its existence — is at work in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK). This is surprising because the PSR is commonly taken to be the hallmark of rationalism, whereas Nāgārjuna is not typically associated with a rationalist tradition. Indeed, it is not uncommon even to take Nāgārjuna as advancing a radical kind of anti-rationalism. One means by which we might resist this conclusion is by establishing that although for Nāgārjuna everything has a reason, it is not the case that everything has a sufficient reason. Evidence for such a view might be found in Nāgārjuna’s anti-foundationalist metaphysic. I argue that although promising, appeal to Nāgārjuna’s anti-foundationalism does not secure the means by which we can deny that the metaphysic of the MMK validates the truth of the PSR. In spite of this negative conclusion, however, much of value is learned along the way. In particular, I argue that what is at issue between the PSR-embracer and the PSR-detractor (of a certain stripe, at least) is not the PSR itself but an ancillary principle that connects reasons with sufficient reasons.