Something a little bit paradoxical: was early Heidegger troubled by the ontological paradoxes?
摘要
Filippo Casati’s book, Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being: An Analytic Interpretation of The Late Heidegger, is a bold work that interprets the notoriously abstruse thought of the late Heidegger using analytical methods. This book has a well-structured approach, both exegetically and philosophically. Concerning Casati’s book, this paper will focus specifically on the first half (Chapters 1–3) of his book and would like to offer some observations primarily from an exegetical and historical perspective. My exegetical concern in this paper is as follows: To what extent was early Heidegger troubled by the ontological paradoxes? The early Heidegger appears to rarely deal with such paradoxes openly. If Heidegger was troubled by such paradoxes or the “very destitute problem” they create, that might be a bit paradoxical. Particularly, this paper presents two specific observations on this point. The first is exegetical and includes criticism. Specifically, Casati asserts that Heidegger accepts the conditional statement: “If x is the subject matter of a statement, x is an entity” (Casati, 2022, 22), but there are textual counterarguments to this. This seems to lead to the conclusion that, at least in Casati’s argument, the following ontological paradox does not arise for Heidegger: “Being is the subject matter of a statement,” and at the same time, “Being is not the subject matter of a statement.” The other observation is a historical one, positioning E. Lask as a predecessor to Heidegger’s “ontological difference” and “infinite regress.” This observation is not so much a critique as it is an indication that considering Lask could contribute to Casati’s argument in certain ways (265 words).