Scholarlink

<p>In <i>The True and the Good</i>, Chase Wrenn wrestles with the problem of truth’s value: those theories which take truth to be inherently valuable do not offer plausible theories of the nature of truth, while the most promising theories of the nature of truth face difficulties in establishing that truth is valuable. Wrenn argues that the reasons for truth being valuable are ultimately <i>moral</i> ones, issuing from the ways in which caring about the truth contributes to human flourishing. This virtue-theoretic solution offers “Aristotelian” theories of truth—which include both correspondence and deflationary theories—a plausible explanation of why truth is valuable. In this paper, I grant that Wrenn’s solution can prove persuasive for substantive Aristotelian theories (such as causal correspondence theories). But I argue that, given some of the reasons for Wrenn’s solution being persuasive for these accounts, it is unclear how deflationary accounts can similarly benefit from his solution. More specifically, I argue that Wrenn’s approach faces the challenge of showing how desires oriented towards truth <i>qua</i> expressive device could plausibly contribute to human flourishing. I also identify one way that Wrenn can meet this challenge, given a defense of deflationism he has developed in an earlier work.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Deflationism and virtue

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月24日

查看全文
  • Adam C. Podlaskowski

摘要

In The True and the Good, Chase Wrenn wrestles with the problem of truth’s value: those theories which take truth to be inherently valuable do not offer plausible theories of the nature of truth, while the most promising theories of the nature of truth face difficulties in establishing that truth is valuable. Wrenn argues that the reasons for truth being valuable are ultimately moral ones, issuing from the ways in which caring about the truth contributes to human flourishing. This virtue-theoretic solution offers “Aristotelian” theories of truth—which include both correspondence and deflationary theories—a plausible explanation of why truth is valuable. In this paper, I grant that Wrenn’s solution can prove persuasive for substantive Aristotelian theories (such as causal correspondence theories). But I argue that, given some of the reasons for Wrenn’s solution being persuasive for these accounts, it is unclear how deflationary accounts can similarly benefit from his solution. More specifically, I argue that Wrenn’s approach faces the challenge of showing how desires oriented towards truth qua expressive device could plausibly contribute to human flourishing. I also identify one way that Wrenn can meet this challenge, given a defense of deflationism he has developed in an earlier work.