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<p>According to the epistemic theory of propositional memory, one’s remembering that <i>p</i> entails his knowledge that <i>p</i>. The epistemic theory is grounded in English speakers’ intuition that a statement such as “X remembers that <i>p</i>, but X does not know that <i>p</i>” is absurd, but there exist counterexamples that challenge that intuition. This paper examines two types of putative counterexamples to the theory from a pragmatic perspective, and shows that the felicitous use of those statements results from the hearer’s accommodation of them in accordance with contextual clues. Ultimately, I contend that no putative counterexamples provide decisive grounds for rejecting the Epistemic Theory, leading to the “intuition-mongering” deadlock, as Chansheng Lai (<i>Philosophical Quarterly</i>, 72(4), 896–917, 2022b) correctly points out.</p>

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Use of “remember”

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年1月12日

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  • Shin Sakuragi

摘要

According to the epistemic theory of propositional memory, one’s remembering that p entails his knowledge that p. The epistemic theory is grounded in English speakers’ intuition that a statement such as “X remembers that p, but X does not know that p” is absurd, but there exist counterexamples that challenge that intuition. This paper examines two types of putative counterexamples to the theory from a pragmatic perspective, and shows that the felicitous use of those statements results from the hearer’s accommodation of them in accordance with contextual clues. Ultimately, I contend that no putative counterexamples provide decisive grounds for rejecting the Epistemic Theory, leading to the “intuition-mongering” deadlock, as Chansheng Lai (Philosophical Quarterly, 72(4), 896–917, 2022b) correctly points out.