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<p>Michael Pelczar, in his fascinating recent book, attempts to answer the main problem that phenomenalism faces, namely that it gives us a world with too many gaps and no rationale for its ordering. He does this by developing a strong doctrine of objective probability. I argue that, if this is to be strong enough to solve the problem, it is no longer immaterialist: the fine line Pelczar needs to walk cannot be held.</p>

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Can ‘permanent possibilities’ be a part of objective reality?

  • 期刊论文

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月5日

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  • Howard Robinson

摘要

Michael Pelczar, in his fascinating recent book, attempts to answer the main problem that phenomenalism faces, namely that it gives us a world with too many gaps and no rationale for its ordering. He does this by developing a strong doctrine of objective probability. I argue that, if this is to be strong enough to solve the problem, it is no longer immaterialist: the fine line Pelczar needs to walk cannot be held.