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<p>Could there be a situation in which speakers of language <i>A</i> assert or accept a sentence <i>P</i> but speakers of language <i>B</i> deny its translation, while there is no ignorance, misunderstanding or error about the world on either side? In discussing this question, I am especially interested in the possibility of a <i>substantial</i> disagreement. Such a disagreement should concern independent facts of the matter. I dismiss several candidates for disagreement. I then present my candidate: the response-enabled property <i>oval</i>. The disagreement can arise because we call geometrical objects oval although <i>oval</i> is no mathematically eligible property. While there remain principled doubts that any disagreement can be both faultless and substantial, it is puzzling to tell how these doubts materialize in the case of disagreement on <i>oval</i>. I close with considering the prospects of generalizing the lesson to parallel cases like imprecision and contestable kinds like <i>jade</i>, <i>tomato</i>, <i>fish,</i> and <i>reptile</i>.</p>

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“‘Oval’ is not a word of mine”: a candidate for substantial yet faultless cross-linguistic disagreement?

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月2日

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  • Daniel Dohrn

摘要

Could there be a situation in which speakers of language A assert or accept a sentence P but speakers of language B deny its translation, while there is no ignorance, misunderstanding or error about the world on either side? In discussing this question, I am especially interested in the possibility of a substantial disagreement. Such a disagreement should concern independent facts of the matter. I dismiss several candidates for disagreement. I then present my candidate: the response-enabled property oval. The disagreement can arise because we call geometrical objects oval although oval is no mathematically eligible property. While there remain principled doubts that any disagreement can be both faultless and substantial, it is puzzling to tell how these doubts materialize in the case of disagreement on oval. I close with considering the prospects of generalizing the lesson to parallel cases like imprecision and contestable kinds like jade, tomato, fish, and reptile.