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<p>In <i>Belief as Emotion</i>, Miriam Schleifer-McCormick argues that the standard view of belief, which understands it in terms of evidence-responsiveness, founders in accounting for “problematic states” such as delusions, implicit bias, political opinions, and trust. If we view belief as an emotion, we get a much more plausible account of these states. She gives additional arguments for the plausibility of the belief-as-emotion thesis. In this piece, I cast doubt on her claims about the limitations of the standard view as well as on the plausibility of the view that belief is an emotion.</p>

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Belief as emotion: comments on Schleifer-McCormick

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年11月8日

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  • Matthew McGrath

摘要

In Belief as Emotion, Miriam Schleifer-McCormick argues that the standard view of belief, which understands it in terms of evidence-responsiveness, founders in accounting for “problematic states” such as delusions, implicit bias, political opinions, and trust. If we view belief as an emotion, we get a much more plausible account of these states. She gives additional arguments for the plausibility of the belief-as-emotion thesis. In this piece, I cast doubt on her claims about the limitations of the standard view as well as on the plausibility of the view that belief is an emotion.