<p>In this paper I present a dilemma for Casati’s dialetheist interpretation of Heidegger. On the one hand, Casati’s main&#xa0;argument in favour of the ontological difference requires that loops of grounding are vicious; on the other hand, the two para-consistent models of the grounding relation discussed in chapter 6 require that loops of grounding are not vicious. We thus face a dilemma: either loops of grounding are vicious (and must therefore be rejected), or they are not. If the former, then Casati can exploit them to argue for the ontological difference, but then he cannot accept the two para-consistent models, since they validate loops. By contrast, if Casati thinks that loops of grounding are not vicious, then he has no problem with the models, but he loses his main argument for the ontological difference. After discussing the prospects of responding to this dilemma, I scrutinize Casati’s second argument in favour of the ontological difference and argue that it can be resisted.</p>