<p>This paper puts forth two claims. First, cancel culture accusations of censorship are components of a practice that embodies a flawed ideology. Second, as components of a practice that embodies a flawed ideology, these accusations contribute to cultivating a hostile epistemic environment. I spell out the first claim with the help of Jason Stanley’s research on flawed ideology. I highlight how a characterization of cancellation that the conservative, right-leaning demographic finds problematic in terms of amounting to a form of censorship preserves desirable outcomes for the privileged group. Drawing on the work of C. Thi Nguyen on hostile epistemology, I spell out the second claim by showing how these accusations exploit our epistemic trust mechanism such that they undermine the uptake of epistemic goods. If the flawed ideology constrains the intelligibility of our actions, then the concept of <i>cancellation</i> becomes problematic. I close by offering a suggestive approach inspired by work in non-ideal epistemology to counteract the flawed ideology.</p>