<p>James Dominic Rooney defends a hylomorphic view where composite material objects, by possessing form, are substances without further substances as proper parts. I challenge both this claim and his argument that such hylomorphism is “inevitable” for mereological restrictivists —those accepting composite objects but rejecting universal composition. I then discuss the value of developing hylomorphic theories (theories of composite objects as bearers of matter and form) with the help of the Confucian notions of <i>pattern</i> (<i>li</i>) and <i>material nature</i> (<i>qì zhì zhī xìng</i>). Putting these notions to work in a hylomorphic theory requires rigorous conceptual clarification—for instance, specifying what possessing a nature entails and how it relates to possessing a form. Properly clarified even untenable proposals can counter charges that describing composite objects as form-bearers is too generic or unintelligible. This is because the clarifications reveal new ways to understand form-possession.</p>