<p>We do not usually mistake memory for perception. However, this does not mean that we know how we distinguish between the two. Here, I explain Bergson’s original conception of the memory–perception distinction by examining his criticism of associationism. First, I elucidate the problem by introducing the terminology used in this paper. Second, I present an overview of associationism. Associationism is an influential philosophical perspective on memory which Bergson criticized in his <i>Matter and Memory</i>. Next, I reconstruct Bergson’s argument against associationism. Through this argument, Bergson shows his original view about the difference between perception and memory: there is not only a difference in degree between these two experiences but also a difference in their nature. I then elucidate Bergson’s original perspectives by analyzing his ideas on the distinction between perception and memory. Bergson held that for someone to recognize the experience of an event as a memory, they must be aware of their ability to select the content of the experience that occurs at different points in time. By contrast, when S is aware that they have no control over the temporal extension of an experience, which originally had a definite temporal extension, then they recognize the experience as a perception.</p>