<p>This paper presents a theistic reply to J. L. Schellenberg’s Hiddenness Argument, which frames the existence of “nonresistant nonbelief”—that is, lack of belief in God which is not due to any resistance on the part of the nonbeliever—as evidence against theism. After reviewing some previous theistic responses to the Hiddenness Argument, I elaborate and build upon Schellenberg’s philosophical methodology, particularly emphasizing a distinction between divine loving and divine valuing. Loving is properly directed toward actual persons as such and presupposes the existence of the beloved, but valuing is properly directed toward possible persons as such and chooses the existence of the beloved. Building on this distinction, I argue that God would value and therefore create persons such as those who exist in our actual world, including nonresistant nonbelievers (i.e., persons who exist in a state of nonresistant nonbelief at some point during the course of their lives). My reasoning is based on the notion that most persons who exist in our actual world are properly valuable; we may discover their value by way of human experience, but God would value such persons even prior to their existence. After formulating an objection to the Hiddenness Argument and a counter-argument in favor of theism, I close with another review of prior literature, explaining how this paper’s reasoning overcomes some of the problems faced by previous theistic responses to the Hiddenness Argument.</p>