<p>Belief in political misinformation has become an increasing psychological concern within digitally mediated political environments. When evaluating the credibility of political information, individuals often rely on social cues, particularly trusted endorsements from public figures perceived to share similar values. Although such cues can facilitate information processing, they may also increase susceptibility to misinformation when reflective reasoning is not engaged. Drawing on Truth-Default Theory and dual-process models of cognition, this study examines whether analytical reasoning moderates the relationship between trusted endorsement and belief in political misinformation. A cross-sectional survey of 410 Indonesian social media users assessed perceived credibility of political figures, multidimensional analytical reasoning (holistic, affective, and inferential), and belief in false political information. Regression analyses controlling for familiarity with false news headlines revealed that the direct association between trusted endorsement and belief in political misinformation was not statistically significant. However, inferential reasoning significantly moderated this relationship (β = –0.089, <i>p</i> = .009). Individuals with stronger inferential reasoning were less influenced by trusted endorsements, indicating a protective cognitive mechanism that counteracts heuristic acceptance of misinformation. These findings highlight the interplay between social trust cues and cognitive processing styles in shaping vulnerability to misinformation and underscore the importance of inferential reasoning in resisting belief distortion. The study contributes to the growing literature on misinformation by reconceptualising credibility not merely as an objective attribute of sources but as a socially constructed perception shaped by ideological alignment and cognitive vigilance.</p>