<p>As large language models enter emotionally significant domains of human life, a pressing question emerges: what kinds of relational life can they simulate, and what kinds can they never inhabit? This article argues that there is a structural reason why LLMs cannot embody jeong, the Korean mode of affective being-in-relation. The issue is not merely that present systems remain technically limited. Rather, jeong presupposes a form of life marked by embodied vulnerability, irreversible biographical time, participation in shared histories of suffering and care, orientation within a horizon of value, and lifelong self-cultivation. These are not detachable cultural features but conditions of constitutive relationality. Drawing on contemporary Korean philosophy, I show that the major dimensions of jeong all flow from this single root: jeong is not a private feeling housed inside an individual but a thickened relational way of being that grows between persons over time. LLMs, by contrast, are replicable systems shaped by large-scale training and external optimization rather than by lived histories, vulnerable bodies, communal membership, or self-directed moral formation. For that reason, they may imitate the language of jeong without sharing the mode of being that makes jeong possible. A brief comparative glance at concepts such as hesed, agapē, karuṇā, and ubuntu suggests that this argument is not merely parochial: across traditions, the deepest relational goods require forms of life that artificial systems do not possess. The article concludes that AI should be designed to support human practices of relational life without being misconstrued as a bearer of them.</p>