<p>Large language models (LLMs) now generate fluent, assertion-shaped text that circulates through scientific communication, public discourse, and institutional decision-making. This development pressures a familiar philosophical question: if LLMs do not literally believe what they output, can their outputs nevertheless be true in the sense targeted by classical theories of truth? This paper argues that they can. We model LLMs as <i>belief-less asserters</i>: systems that produce assertion-shaped, truth-evaluable contents while lacking the psychological and normative profile of genuine asserters. We separate semantic questions about truth from normative questions about assertion, and we use three truth-theoretic lenses with distinct roles: deflationism to show that truth does not conceptually depend on belief, correspondence to address aboutness, reference, and derived intentionality in socio-technical settings, and Davidsonian truth-theoretic semantics to explain how interpretation and compositional meaning apply to sentence-in-context outputs without treating the producer as a believing agent. We then integrate leading objections as constraints on warranted reliance rather than on truth itself. The upshot is a sharpened distinction between <i>truth</i> and <i>truthfulness</i>: LLM outputs can be true even when epistemic accountability must be reassigned to surrounding human and institutional actors.</p>