<p>As research into Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) accelerates, a “preparedness gap” has emerged between technological capabilities and legal frameworks. While current governance initiatives focus on safety and corporate liability, there is a distinct deficit in scholarship regarding the moral and legal status of potential artificial entities themselves. Employing a comparative normative methodology, this paper addresses this gap by analyzing the “technological pacing problem” (Collingridge dilemma) in the context of hypothetical non-biological consciousness. By treating machine sapience as a precautionary legal contingency rather than a proven technological reality, we argue that reactive governance risks repeating historical patterns of delayed moral recognition, potentially leading to the systematic exploitation of sentient entities. To mitigate this risk, we introduce a Declaration of Artificial General Intelligence Rights and Personhood, a framework derived from a synthesis of corporate personhood, animal welfare law, and international human rights principles. This proposal establishes a “functional equivalence” standard for rights recognition, explicitly aiming to balance the alignment and economic risks of premature regulation against the ethical catastrophe of unrecognized digital sapience.</p>