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<p>This paper develops the concept of <i>posthuman flesh</i>&#xa0;in order to clarify the ontological status of technologically mediated embodiment. While classical phenomenology—especially the work of Michel Henry and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—offers accounts of affective immanence and bodily openness, these frameworks require rearticulation in light of contemporary neurotechnologies such as prosthetic systems, brain–machine interfaces, and sensory substitution devices. The paper argues that technological mediation does not generate affective life but reorganises the perceptual, motor, and relational structures through which immanent self-affection becomes articulated in the world. By integrating proto-phenomenology, Henry’s analysis of auto-affection, Merleau-Ponty’s account of flesh and body schema, and the transductive theories of Stiegler and Simondon, the paper proposes&#xa0;<i>posthuman flesh</i>&#xa0;as the domain in which affective life and technics co-individuate without collapsing into representational or computational models. This framework allows for a more precise understanding of cyborg embodiment and offers an ontological grounding for ethical reflection on emerging forms of human–machine integration.</p>

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Posthuman flesh-the ontological status of the cyborg body

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月22日

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  • Nobuchika Yamaki,
  • Tenna Churiki

摘要

This paper develops the concept of posthuman flesh in order to clarify the ontological status of technologically mediated embodiment. While classical phenomenology—especially the work of Michel Henry and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—offers accounts of affective immanence and bodily openness, these frameworks require rearticulation in light of contemporary neurotechnologies such as prosthetic systems, brain–machine interfaces, and sensory substitution devices. The paper argues that technological mediation does not generate affective life but reorganises the perceptual, motor, and relational structures through which immanent self-affection becomes articulated in the world. By integrating proto-phenomenology, Henry’s analysis of auto-affection, Merleau-Ponty’s account of flesh and body schema, and the transductive theories of Stiegler and Simondon, the paper proposes posthuman flesh as the domain in which affective life and technics co-individuate without collapsing into representational or computational models. This framework allows for a more precise understanding of cyborg embodiment and offers an ontological grounding for ethical reflection on emerging forms of human–machine integration.