<p>This paper adopts a constructivist and relational framework to examine contemporary claims about information, ethics, and artificial intelligence, offering a conceptual rather than empirical analysis situated within a specific theoretical perspective. Contemporary debates in the ethics of artificial intelligence increasingly rely on an informational ontology, according to which information constitutes the fundamental layer of reality and moral values can be integrated into artificial systems through responsible design. This paper critically examines this framework by adopting a constructivist and relational account of information, subjectivity, and ethics. Rather than treating information as a foundational ontological category, the paper argues that information should be understood as a system-dependent construct emerging from processes of distinction, interpretation, and functional relevance. On this basis, the paper questions the view that ethics can be directly programmed into artificial systems and proposes instead that ethical behavior may emerge from relational adaptation, learning, and interaction within complex environments. The argument is developed through a conceptual and philosophical analysis, drawing on constructivist epistemology, systems theory, and contemporary accounts of cognition. By reframing ethics as an emergent and relational process rather than a transferable set of rules, the paper aims to contribute to ongoing discussions on the limits of ethics-by-design approaches and the conditions under which artificial systems may develop ethically relevant forms of behavior.</p>