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<p>In this paper, I explore the grounds for the moral treatment of robots by proposing a new relational approach inspired by Japanese animistic thought. Traditionally, two major approaches have dominated discussions on the moral treatment of robots: (1) <i>The properties approach</i>, which bases moral treatment on intrinsic properties such as consciousness and sentience (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 6(4):203–213, 2004; Bryson in Wilks (ed) Close engagements with artificial companions: key social, psychological, ethical and design issues, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 2010; Mosakas in AI Soc 36(2):429–443, 2021; DeGrazia in Perspect Biol Med 65(1):73–88, 2022), and (2) <i>the relational approach</i>, which bases moral treatment on the appearance of robots within relationships (Coeckelbergh in Philos Technol 27(1):61–77, 2014, Coeckelbergh in Minds Mach. 31:337–360, 2021, Coeckelbergh in Ethics Inf Technol 25(3):44, 2023; Gunkel in Robot rights, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2018, Gunkel in Loh and Loh (eds) Social robotics and the good life: the normative side of forming emotional bonds with robots. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2022). Building on the foundational work on the relational approach of Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, I explore the potential and implications for expanding the relational approach by introducing an animistic understanding of the mind. To do so, I adopt an animistic perspective, distinguishing between two forms of animism: <i>mind-reading animism</i> and <i>mind-infusing animism</i>. The distinction between these approaches lies in their understanding of the “mind.” Mind-reading animism interprets the mind as an inherent, static property, making moral treatment dependent on human-like properties. In contrast, mind-infusing animism, drawing on Ōmori Shōzō’s philosophical view, interprets the mind as dynamically constructed through interaction. Rather than focusing on static, human-like properties, this approach emphasizes the relational process in which robots are infused with a mind through interaction. By framing the moral treatment of robots within this relational dynamic, mind-infusing animism provides a new relational framework for evaluating the moral treatment of robots. Finally, while mind-infusing animism provides a meaningful contribution to advancing relational approaches, we point out that it also faces limitations.</p>

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Should we treat robots morally? Towards a relational account by mind-infusing animism

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年6月23日

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  • Hayate Shimizu

摘要

In this paper, I explore the grounds for the moral treatment of robots by proposing a new relational approach inspired by Japanese animistic thought. Traditionally, two major approaches have dominated discussions on the moral treatment of robots: (1) The properties approach, which bases moral treatment on intrinsic properties such as consciousness and sentience (Sparrow in Ethics Inf Technol 6(4):203–213, 2004; Bryson in Wilks (ed) Close engagements with artificial companions: key social, psychological, ethical and design issues, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 2010; Mosakas in AI Soc 36(2):429–443, 2021; DeGrazia in Perspect Biol Med 65(1):73–88, 2022), and (2) the relational approach, which bases moral treatment on the appearance of robots within relationships (Coeckelbergh in Philos Technol 27(1):61–77, 2014, Coeckelbergh in Minds Mach. 31:337–360, 2021, Coeckelbergh in Ethics Inf Technol 25(3):44, 2023; Gunkel in Robot rights, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2018, Gunkel in Loh and Loh (eds) Social robotics and the good life: the normative side of forming emotional bonds with robots. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2022). Building on the foundational work on the relational approach of Coeckelbergh and Gunkel, I explore the potential and implications for expanding the relational approach by introducing an animistic understanding of the mind. To do so, I adopt an animistic perspective, distinguishing between two forms of animism: mind-reading animism and mind-infusing animism. The distinction between these approaches lies in their understanding of the “mind.” Mind-reading animism interprets the mind as an inherent, static property, making moral treatment dependent on human-like properties. In contrast, mind-infusing animism, drawing on Ōmori Shōzō’s philosophical view, interprets the mind as dynamically constructed through interaction. Rather than focusing on static, human-like properties, this approach emphasizes the relational process in which robots are infused with a mind through interaction. By framing the moral treatment of robots within this relational dynamic, mind-infusing animism provides a new relational framework for evaluating the moral treatment of robots. Finally, while mind-infusing animism provides a meaningful contribution to advancing relational approaches, we point out that it also faces limitations.