Protected-area managers must balance ecological integrity and equitable local development under binding ecological constraints. We develop a triadic Stackelberg policy model in which a regulator chooses the mix of regulatory intensity \(g\) and ecological compensation \(\theta \) , while enterprises and communities best-respond via scale and compliance/participation. Analytical results establish the existence of an interior, welfare-maximizing policy mix and characterize when \(g\) and \(\theta \) act as complements versus substitutes. Scenario-based simulations—ecology-prioritizing, development-prioritizing, and balanced regimes—map a policy–outcome response surface and delineate a policy feasibility region (managerial operating region) in the \(g\) – \(\theta \) plane. Outside this region, trajectories tend toward over-development or conservation lock-in. Sensitivity analyses provide decision cues: higher enforcement efficiency relative to compliance costs favours raising \(g\) ; steep enforcement costs or social frictions favour raising \(\theta \) up to thresholds that avoid moral hazard. Our framework is static but can inform adaptive management: the analytical response surface provides baseline relationships that managers can use when monitoring indicators, recalibrating parameters and adjusting policy levers. Modelling such dynamic feedbacks lies beyond the scope of this paper. The approach generalises to licensing and payment schemes in protected areas and yields transparent, reproducible rules for aligning ecological protection with development goals.
