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<p>This paper examines the relationship between institutional trust, social trust, and civic participation in Morocco through the lens of coordination-game theory. Using nationally representative data from Afrobarometer Round 8, we analyze whether trust in political and coercive institutions predicts participation in community meetings, collective issue raising, contacting officials, and voting. We also test whether institutional and neighbour trust interact to generate strategic complementarities, as predicted by coordination models of civic action. The results show that trust in local and national political institutions does not significantly increase participation, while high trust in the police is associated with lower collective mobilisation. Moreover, we find no evidence of interaction effects between institutional and social trust; citizens with high levels of both forms of trust are no more likely to participate than those with lower levels. These findings suggest that Morocco is situated in a stable low-participation equilibrium, where expectations of institutional responsiveness and peer engagement are insufficient to trigger civic action. The study highlights the importance of credibility, institutional responsiveness, and collective expectations in shaping participation, and provides new empirical evidence linking coordination-game theory to political behaviour in developing countries.</p>

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Participation as a coordination game: micro-evidence from Morocco

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月17日

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  • Zakaria Mansouri,
  • Mariem Liouaeddine,
  • Samir En-nia

摘要

This paper examines the relationship between institutional trust, social trust, and civic participation in Morocco through the lens of coordination-game theory. Using nationally representative data from Afrobarometer Round 8, we analyze whether trust in political and coercive institutions predicts participation in community meetings, collective issue raising, contacting officials, and voting. We also test whether institutional and neighbour trust interact to generate strategic complementarities, as predicted by coordination models of civic action. The results show that trust in local and national political institutions does not significantly increase participation, while high trust in the police is associated with lower collective mobilisation. Moreover, we find no evidence of interaction effects between institutional and social trust; citizens with high levels of both forms of trust are no more likely to participate than those with lower levels. These findings suggest that Morocco is situated in a stable low-participation equilibrium, where expectations of institutional responsiveness and peer engagement are insufficient to trigger civic action. The study highlights the importance of credibility, institutional responsiveness, and collective expectations in shaping participation, and provides new empirical evidence linking coordination-game theory to political behaviour in developing countries.