The treasury single account regime and fiscal regulations in the universities: empirical evidence from Nigeria
摘要
This study critically assesses the effectiveness of the Treasury Single Account (TSA) in curbing corruption in the three purposively selected Nigerian federal universities in the South-South region. Anchored in Agency Theory, the study explores the principal-agent dynamics underpinning fiscal regulations and evaluates how centralised financial control interfaces with institutional autonomy and administrative and human behaviour. A mixed method was employed, integrating quantitative survey data from 171 key university personnel with qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews, complemented with interpretation of secondary data sources. Findings reveal that while TSA has significantly strengthened fiscal regulation, corrupt practices have not been eliminated but rather reconfigured into less traceable forms, such as procurement fraud and contract inflation. The study concludes that although TSA has closed certain financial loopholes, it is insufficient as a standalone measure. It recommends a recalibrated reform strategy that combines the TSA with implementing complementary value reorientation and comprehensive anti-corruption frameworks.