Scholarlink

<p>After 25&#xa0;years and numerous reforms in response to previous crises, how fit is economic policy governance in EMU to address the climate challenge? We explore this question through the lens of political economy in political sociology and heterodox economics, based on a review and discussion of key contributions to the literature. We first take stock of the changes in the economic policy governance framework in EMU since its inception, with a particular focus on the ECB, to discuss the extent to which recent transformations since 2020 potentially represent a shift away from the initial “stability” paradigm towards one more concerned with redistributive and climate objectives. We then discuss the issues raised by these changes, reflecting on the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, on the independence and politicisation of the ECB, and on the desirable degree of financialisation in EMU. Finally, we discuss possible changes to the economic policy governance framework in response to these challenges. We conclude that further reforms are needed for EMU to be fully fit to address the climate challenge.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

After 25 years of reforms of economic policy governance, is EMU fit to address the climate challenge? A political economy view

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月5日

查看全文
  • Caroline Vincensini

摘要

After 25 years and numerous reforms in response to previous crises, how fit is economic policy governance in EMU to address the climate challenge? We explore this question through the lens of political economy in political sociology and heterodox economics, based on a review and discussion of key contributions to the literature. We first take stock of the changes in the economic policy governance framework in EMU since its inception, with a particular focus on the ECB, to discuss the extent to which recent transformations since 2020 potentially represent a shift away from the initial “stability” paradigm towards one more concerned with redistributive and climate objectives. We then discuss the issues raised by these changes, reflecting on the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, on the independence and politicisation of the ECB, and on the desirable degree of financialisation in EMU. Finally, we discuss possible changes to the economic policy governance framework in response to these challenges. We conclude that further reforms are needed for EMU to be fully fit to address the climate challenge.