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<p>This paper analyses the warnings that were expressed before the introduction of the Euro and investigates whether the alerters’ conviction that the Euro crisis proved them right is justified. It seems to be the case that the real problems were quite different from the ones discussed before 1999. The paper investigates the question on several levels:<UnorderedList Mark="Bullet"> <ItemContent> <p>It analyses the development of the textbook by De Grauwe from the 1st to the current (14th) edition and shows that the problems that were discussed before and during the first years of the monetary union were quite different from the ones that were important in the crisis.</p> </ItemContent> <ItemContent> <p>It looks at some contributions from international economists: Paul Krugman, Barry Eichengreen, and the debate between Charles Wyplosz and Martin Feldstein.</p> </ItemContent> <ItemContent> <p>A special emphasis lies on the contributions of the German Council of Economic Experts (“Sachverständigenrat”): The Council’s analyses are a prime example of concentrating on matters that turned out to be of minor importance in the Euro crisis whereas other topics were not touched upon at all.</p> </ItemContent> <ItemContent> <p>Furthermore, it will be shown that before the outbreak of the Euro crisis, some characteristics that turned out to be detrimental for the monetary union were not regarded as a bug, but as a feature. One example is the current account imbalances; another example is the fact of the Euro being like a foreign currency from the perspective of the member states.</p> </ItemContent> </UnorderedList></p>

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The introduction of the Euro: who warned, and why?

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月2日

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  • Johannes Schmidt

摘要

This paper analyses the warnings that were expressed before the introduction of the Euro and investigates whether the alerters’ conviction that the Euro crisis proved them right is justified. It seems to be the case that the real problems were quite different from the ones discussed before 1999. The paper investigates the question on several levels:

It analyses the development of the textbook by De Grauwe from the 1st to the current (14th) edition and shows that the problems that were discussed before and during the first years of the monetary union were quite different from the ones that were important in the crisis.

It looks at some contributions from international economists: Paul Krugman, Barry Eichengreen, and the debate between Charles Wyplosz and Martin Feldstein.

A special emphasis lies on the contributions of the German Council of Economic Experts (“Sachverständigenrat”): The Council’s analyses are a prime example of concentrating on matters that turned out to be of minor importance in the Euro crisis whereas other topics were not touched upon at all.

Furthermore, it will be shown that before the outbreak of the Euro crisis, some characteristics that turned out to be detrimental for the monetary union were not regarded as a bug, but as a feature. One example is the current account imbalances; another example is the fact of the Euro being like a foreign currency from the perspective of the member states.