A coevolutionary approach to institutional lock-in

Some countries get stuck in suboptimal trajectories and remain there for decades, a phenomenon known as institutional lock-in. In the evolutionary literature, institutional lock-in is explained by a unidirectional link between mental models (ideas, beliefs) and institutions. In contrast, the conventional non-evolutionary view considers institutions as exogenously given, with individuals choosing among them, implying another unidirectional link between mental models and institutions. In this paper, I develop a coevolutionary view of the institutional lock-in phenomenon, emphasizing the path-dependencies of both mental models and institutions and their mutual influence. I use this perspective to analyze the susceptibility of different political-economic systems to institutional lock-in. I conclude by hypothesizing that an ideal-type socialism is the most prone to lock in, followed by an ideal-type welfare state and an ideal-type free market system. Future research could test this framework through simulation models or empirical strategies.