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<p>The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a widely recognized, extensively utilized, and thoroughly studied industry-standard symmetric key block cipher. Consequently, cryptanalysis of AES is a highly relevant and significant task for cryptography researchers. In the field of cryptanalysis, the Square attack is a powerful key recovery technique used against symmetric ciphers. This study aims to provide two efficient implementations of the partial sum attack (PSA), a variant of the square attack, on reduced rounds of AES. The goal is to demonstrate the effectiveness of these implementations in terms of reduced time complexity for full key recovery. We demonstrate two efficient implementations of PSA on reduced rounds of AES. The first implementation is a GPU-based attack applied to five and six rounds of AES, achieving full key recovery in 0.8s and 7.58 days, respectively. The second implementation is cluster-based, applied to six rounds of AES, with an elapsed time of 2.5 days for full key recovery. Both implementations leverage parallelization to enhance performance, showing a significant reduction in attack time proportional to the number of working threads. The findings confirm that PSA effectively reduces the time complexity for full key recovery in reduced rounds of AES, demonstrating the practicality and efficiency of these implementations.</p>

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Partial Sum Attack on Round-Reduced AES Utilizing Parallel Computation Approaches

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月25日

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  • Debranjan Pal,
  • Ankit Gupta,
  • Abhijit Das,
  • Dipanwita Roy Chowdhury

摘要

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a widely recognized, extensively utilized, and thoroughly studied industry-standard symmetric key block cipher. Consequently, cryptanalysis of AES is a highly relevant and significant task for cryptography researchers. In the field of cryptanalysis, the Square attack is a powerful key recovery technique used against symmetric ciphers. This study aims to provide two efficient implementations of the partial sum attack (PSA), a variant of the square attack, on reduced rounds of AES. The goal is to demonstrate the effectiveness of these implementations in terms of reduced time complexity for full key recovery. We demonstrate two efficient implementations of PSA on reduced rounds of AES. The first implementation is a GPU-based attack applied to five and six rounds of AES, achieving full key recovery in 0.8s and 7.58 days, respectively. The second implementation is cluster-based, applied to six rounds of AES, with an elapsed time of 2.5 days for full key recovery. Both implementations leverage parallelization to enhance performance, showing a significant reduction in attack time proportional to the number of working threads. The findings confirm that PSA effectively reduces the time complexity for full key recovery in reduced rounds of AES, demonstrating the practicality and efficiency of these implementations.