Scholarlink

<p>This paper examines how the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s “Inflation-Overshooting Commitment” and cost-push shocks contributed to its exit from a liquidity trap during 2024–2025. To this end, we use a New Keynesian model incorporating shocks to demand and inflation, along with simple monetary policy rules. Our simulations show that such rules, especially those that maintain a zero interest rate even amid high inflation after 2021, can significantly elevate inflation. Under a price-level targeting rule, inflation exceeds 2%, while the average inflation targeting rule stabilizes inflation close to 2% over an extended period. These findings indicate that both policy commitment and cost-push shocks played a quantitative role in raising inflation and widening the output gap, ultimately facilitating the BOJ’s exit policy.</p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Do monetary policy and cost-push shock matter? Bank of Japan’s exit policy in 2024–2025

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年2月2日

查看全文
  • Kohei Hasui,
  • Yuki Teranishi

摘要

This paper examines how the Bank of Japan (BOJ)’s “Inflation-Overshooting Commitment” and cost-push shocks contributed to its exit from a liquidity trap during 2024–2025. To this end, we use a New Keynesian model incorporating shocks to demand and inflation, along with simple monetary policy rules. Our simulations show that such rules, especially those that maintain a zero interest rate even amid high inflation after 2021, can significantly elevate inflation. Under a price-level targeting rule, inflation exceeds 2%, while the average inflation targeting rule stabilizes inflation close to 2% over an extended period. These findings indicate that both policy commitment and cost-push shocks played a quantitative role in raising inflation and widening the output gap, ultimately facilitating the BOJ’s exit policy.