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<p>I survey the benefits of keeping players in the dark about payoff- or strategy-relevant variables in dynamic games. Topics include repeated games with private monitoring, stochastic games with incomplete information, and repeated/stochastic games with an omniscient mediator. I emphasize how keeping players in the dark reduces their deviation gains and hence possibly expands the set of equilibrium outcomes.</p>

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Keeping players in the dark: benefits of private monitoring

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月1日

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  • Takuo Sugaya

摘要

I survey the benefits of keeping players in the dark about payoff- or strategy-relevant variables in dynamic games. Topics include repeated games with private monitoring, stochastic games with incomplete information, and repeated/stochastic games with an omniscient mediator. I emphasize how keeping players in the dark reduces their deviation gains and hence possibly expands the set of equilibrium outcomes.