Scholarlink

<p>This paper analyzes Shinohara Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a variant of the classic RPS game introduced by board game designer Yoshiteru Shinohara. Players compete against a host who always plays rock, so they choose either rock or paper. The twist is that if two or more players choose paper, they are eliminated, and the last remaining player is the winner, creating strategic tension among the players. There exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, in which the probability of choosing paper satisfies the equation <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <InlineMediaObject> <ImageObject Color="BlackWhite" FileRef="42973_2025_205_Article_IEq1.gif" Format="GIF" Height="20" Rendition="HTML" Resolution="72" Type="Linedraw" Width="194" /> </InlineMediaObject> <EquationSource Format="TEX">\((1-p)^{n-1} + p^{n-1}/n = 1/n\)</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"><math> <mrow> <msup> <mrow> <mo stretchy="false">(</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo>-</mo> <mi>p</mi> <mo stretchy="false">)</mo> </mrow> <mrow> <mi>n</mi> <mo>-</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msup> <mo>+</mo> <msup> <mi>p</mi> <mrow> <mi>n</mi> <mo>-</mo> <mn>1</mn> </mrow> </msup> <mo stretchy="false">/</mo> <mi>n</mi> <mo>=</mo> <mn>1</mn> <mo stretchy="false">/</mo> <mi>n</mi> </mrow> </math></EquationSource> </InlineEquation> when <i>n</i> players remain. The game also admits a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. </p>

错误：搜索内容不能为空，请输入英文关键词
错误：关键词超出字数限制，请精简
高级检索

Shinohara Rock-Paper-Scissors

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年5月6日

查看全文
  • Takashi Ui

摘要

This paper analyzes Shinohara Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS), a variant of the classic RPS game introduced by board game designer Yoshiteru Shinohara. Players compete against a host who always plays rock, so they choose either rock or paper. The twist is that if two or more players choose paper, they are eliminated, and the last remaining player is the winner, creating strategic tension among the players. There exists a unique symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium, in which the probability of choosing paper satisfies the equation \((1-p)^{n-1} + p^{n-1}/n = 1/n\) ( 1 - p ) n - 1 + p n - 1 / n = 1 / n when n players remain. The game also admits a continuum of asymmetric equilibria.