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<p>This study focuses on the security challenges posed by coordinated cyber-physical attacks to cyber-physical power systems (CPPS). It examines the allocation of resources as a means of counteracting these attacks and developing defense strategies. A risk-based two-player zero-sum static game model is proposed to analyze the interaction between the attacker and defender. The model seeks to determine the optimal resource allocation strategy given limited resources. Initially, a risk assessment is conducted to quantify the impacts resulting from coordinated cyber-physical attacks. An operating cost optimization problem, formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming problem, is used to represent the impact of a successful attack. Subsequently, models for both the attacker and defender are established. The attacker aims to maximize risk by allocating attack resources, whereas the defender aims to minimize risk by allocating defense resources. Ultimately, the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the risk-based game is determined by solving the model. The proposed model’s efficacy is demonstrated by testing it on an IEEE-14 bus system.</p>

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Coordinated Cyber Physical Attacks and Defense Strategy in Cyber-Physical Power Systems Based on Game Theory

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年4月7日

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  • Jun Yang,
  • Yulong Zhao,
  • Chenchen Dong

摘要

This study focuses on the security challenges posed by coordinated cyber-physical attacks to cyber-physical power systems (CPPS). It examines the allocation of resources as a means of counteracting these attacks and developing defense strategies. A risk-based two-player zero-sum static game model is proposed to analyze the interaction between the attacker and defender. The model seeks to determine the optimal resource allocation strategy given limited resources. Initially, a risk assessment is conducted to quantify the impacts resulting from coordinated cyber-physical attacks. An operating cost optimization problem, formulated as a mixed-integer linear programming problem, is used to represent the impact of a successful attack. Subsequently, models for both the attacker and defender are established. The attacker aims to maximize risk by allocating attack resources, whereas the defender aims to minimize risk by allocating defense resources. Ultimately, the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the risk-based game is determined by solving the model. The proposed model’s efficacy is demonstrated by testing it on an IEEE-14 bus system.