<p>The US extended deterrence is an important component of South Korea’s security strategy. With the continuous development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, coupled with profound changes in the regional security landscape, skepticism about the credibility of US extended deterrence has increasingly intensified within South Korea. In response, the US and South Korea have recently made certain adjustments to the extended deterrence model. Overall, South Korea’s participation in the US extended nuclear deterrence system has markedly increased, and the trend of the US and South Korea emulating the NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements has become increasingly evident. This development is closely related to South Korea’s urgent need for nuclear deterrence against North Korea and adjustments in US deterrence strategy. However, from the perspectives of the consultation process between the US and South Korea, the legal constraints of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the opposition of regional countries, it is difficult to fully replicate the NATO model in the short term. Nevertheless, considering the advancement of modern weapon technologies and South Korea’s expansive interpretation of the “nuclear sharing” concept, the possibility cannot be ruled out that South Korea might further engage in US nuclear deterrence-related consultations and practices indirectly, thereby enhancing its role and influence within the nuclear deterrence framework.</p>

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Adjustments and motivations behind the US–South Korea extended deterrence model

  • Wenzhi Song

摘要

The US extended deterrence is an important component of South Korea’s security strategy. With the continuous development of North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, coupled with profound changes in the regional security landscape, skepticism about the credibility of US extended deterrence has increasingly intensified within South Korea. In response, the US and South Korea have recently made certain adjustments to the extended deterrence model. Overall, South Korea’s participation in the US extended nuclear deterrence system has markedly increased, and the trend of the US and South Korea emulating the NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements has become increasingly evident. This development is closely related to South Korea’s urgent need for nuclear deterrence against North Korea and adjustments in US deterrence strategy. However, from the perspectives of the consultation process between the US and South Korea, the legal constraints of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the opposition of regional countries, it is difficult to fully replicate the NATO model in the short term. Nevertheless, considering the advancement of modern weapon technologies and South Korea’s expansive interpretation of the “nuclear sharing” concept, the possibility cannot be ruled out that South Korea might further engage in US nuclear deterrence-related consultations and practices indirectly, thereby enhancing its role and influence within the nuclear deterrence framework.