<p>The growing sharing economy presents more opportunities and ideas for shared manufacturing, but it continues to encounter obstacles, including insufficient motivation for participation and an ineffective revenue allocation structure. This paper focuses on the revenue allocation mechanism of the capacity supplier and third-party shared manufacturing platform. It considers the influence of digitization levels and seeks to optimize revenue for both parties. This study formulates the Nash non-cooperative game, the Stackelberg master–slave game, and the collaborative cooperation game model to establish an optimal revenue allocation mechanism utilizing differential game theory. The dynamic revenue allocation mechanism between the capacity supplier and the third-party shared manufacturing platform during cooperation is analyzed. The numerical simulations are used to examine the sensitivity of interconnected parameters. The research finds that the revenue and digitalization level of the Stackelberg master–slave game exceed those of the Nash non-cooperative game when the revenue allocation share of the third-party shared manufacturing platform exceeds one-third. Both parties can achieve a Pareto optimum state for total revenue and digitalization level through cooperation. This research provides strategic options for optimizing the interests of participating entities while enhancing and expanding the theoretical framework of shared manufacturing.</p>