<p>This paper critically examines Fatima H. Sadek’s (2024) defense of the moral/conventional (M/C) distinction, which identifies perceived harm as the central explanatory mechanism underlying moral judgments. While Sadek provides a psychologically compelling account supported by empirical research, I argue that the explanatory role attributed to perceived harm is stronger than the available evidence warrants.The paper does not dispute the empirical association between perceived harm and moral judgment. Rather, it questions whether perceived harm can adequately serve as the sole or foundational mechanism underlying the moral/conventional distinction. First, evidence that perceived harm predicts moral judgment does not by itself establish that perceived harm provides the primary explanation of moral evaluation. Second, important moral considerations such as fairness, equality, justice, and rights may not be fully reducible to perceptions of harm. Third, contemporary research suggests that the relationship between harm perception and moral judgment is often reciprocal, such that moral evaluations may themselves shape what individuals perceive as harmful.In response, I propose a context-sensitive pluralistic model of moral judgment. On this account, perceived harm remains an important contributor to moral evaluation, but it operates alongside other morally relevant considerations whose relative salience is shaped by social and cultural contexts. Moral judgments are therefore better understood as emerging from the context-sensitive activation of multiple moral concerns rather than from a single harm-based mechanism. I conclude that the moral/conventional distinction remains a valuable framework for understanding normative cognition, but its psychological basis is more pluralistic and context-dependent than Sadek’s harm-centered account allows.</p>