<p>In some educational, therapeutic, and relational vocabularies—particularly those shaped by mindfulness-oriented approaches and practices emphasizing openness and restraint from premature evaluation—non-judgment is treated less as a descriptive psychological state than as a desirable ethical posture associated with openness and empathic presence. While this ideal has normative appeal, it leaves insufficiently explored the conditions under which certain forms of judgment continue to arise in everyday experience. This article offers an interpretive theoretical contribution that focuses on specific forms of judgment emerging under conditions of experiential asymmetry—situations in which individuals encounter perspectives, behaviors, or forms of life that cannot be readily integrated within their established identity frameworks. Drawing on insights from social psychology, cultural anthropology, and phenomenological approaches, identity is conceptualized as an experiential structure that organizes perception and meaning prior to conscious evaluation. Within this framework, certain judgments can be understood as pre-reflective responses that reduce interpretive uncertainty and preserve identity coherence when difference is experienced as destabilizing. From this perspective, the ideal of non-judgment is reconsidered not as a fully attainable psychological state, but as a reflective practice constrained by the structural conditions of identity. Rather than eliminating judgment, such practice involves recognizing its conditions of emergence and creating space for delayed interpretation. An illustrative scenario is introduced to show how judgment arises where experiential access is limited, followed by an extension of the analysis to collective contexts, where similar mechanisms contribute to boundary formation and structural incomprehension. By shifting the focus from moralized evaluation to interpretive understanding, the article highlights the limits of moralized approaches to judgment and emphasizes the role of reflexivity in engaging with difference under conditions of partial understanding.</p>

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Judgment under Conditions of Experiential Asymmetry: An Interpretive Theoretical Approach

  • Jaoudat Moussalli

摘要

In some educational, therapeutic, and relational vocabularies—particularly those shaped by mindfulness-oriented approaches and practices emphasizing openness and restraint from premature evaluation—non-judgment is treated less as a descriptive psychological state than as a desirable ethical posture associated with openness and empathic presence. While this ideal has normative appeal, it leaves insufficiently explored the conditions under which certain forms of judgment continue to arise in everyday experience. This article offers an interpretive theoretical contribution that focuses on specific forms of judgment emerging under conditions of experiential asymmetry—situations in which individuals encounter perspectives, behaviors, or forms of life that cannot be readily integrated within their established identity frameworks. Drawing on insights from social psychology, cultural anthropology, and phenomenological approaches, identity is conceptualized as an experiential structure that organizes perception and meaning prior to conscious evaluation. Within this framework, certain judgments can be understood as pre-reflective responses that reduce interpretive uncertainty and preserve identity coherence when difference is experienced as destabilizing. From this perspective, the ideal of non-judgment is reconsidered not as a fully attainable psychological state, but as a reflective practice constrained by the structural conditions of identity. Rather than eliminating judgment, such practice involves recognizing its conditions of emergence and creating space for delayed interpretation. An illustrative scenario is introduced to show how judgment arises where experiential access is limited, followed by an extension of the analysis to collective contexts, where similar mechanisms contribute to boundary formation and structural incomprehension. By shifting the focus from moralized evaluation to interpretive understanding, the article highlights the limits of moralized approaches to judgment and emphasizes the role of reflexivity in engaging with difference under conditions of partial understanding.