The Ontological Significance of Foundherentism
摘要
There are only a few aspects of existence that can be described as universal to the human species. One of those universals is consciousness, the experience of “I” and the concomitant awareness of being finite that “I” experience in the face of what is perceivably although perhaps not literally an infinite cosmos. Within the experience of “I” there are other universals that everybody recognizes as constitutive of what it means to be human in the first place, perhaps none so much as emotional sensation. However, there is one universal that seems to avoid meaningful recognition even if it is not ignored outright, and perhaps that is because “the world” as we experience it is so complicated and our lives so enmeshed in its trappings that to wonder about its nature would be akin to marveling at the biomechanical genius involved in the manipulation of tools with the human hand. Though understandable, there is great utility in developing a nuanced conceptual model of the way we construct and experience the “worlds” in which each of us resides. In this essay, I utilize the underlying principles of Susan Haack’s foundherentism to describe an ontological conception of “world” that is more accessible to those both within and outside of the continental tradition of philosophy, highlighting the often-overlooked mutual interdependence of seemingly disparate philosophical traditions while providing readers with a relatable heuristic for individual comportment.