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<p>In her book <i>Epiphanies</i> Sophie Grace Chappell launches a&#xa0;powerful attack on systematic moral theorizing. She argues that systematic moral theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism involve “a&#xa0;kind of forcing of the issue, a&#xa0;kind of reluctance to let things have their natural shape, an insistence on fitting them into a&#xa0;predetermined framework”.</p><p>This point is well taken. But it is one thing to reject systematic moral theory building, with its ideals of parsimony and scientific exactness, and quite another thing to deny systematic relations in moral reality itself. After all, some values are more important than others. There is a&#xa0;hierarchy of kinds of value by which we orient our lives.</p><p>Drawing on the work of the phenomenologist Max Scheler, I&#xa0;propose that there is indeed a&#xa0;“systematic character residing in things themselves.” First of all, our emotional life is stratified. We experience feelings on four different levels: sensible, vital, psychic (mental), and, at the deepest level, spiritual. There is a&#xa0;second and corresponding hierarchy that concerns values. And there is, finally, a&#xa0;third hierarchy, namely of moral models instantiating these values. Living morally means living in accordance with this value ordering. What is lacking in Chappell’s approach is the idea of a&#xa0;felt hierarchy of values.</p>

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Some values are more important than others

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年4月9日

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  • Angelika Krebs

摘要

In her book Epiphanies Sophie Grace Chappell launches a powerful attack on systematic moral theorizing. She argues that systematic moral theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism involve “a kind of forcing of the issue, a kind of reluctance to let things have their natural shape, an insistence on fitting them into a predetermined framework”.

This point is well taken. But it is one thing to reject systematic moral theory building, with its ideals of parsimony and scientific exactness, and quite another thing to deny systematic relations in moral reality itself. After all, some values are more important than others. There is a hierarchy of kinds of value by which we orient our lives.

Drawing on the work of the phenomenologist Max Scheler, I propose that there is indeed a “systematic character residing in things themselves.” First of all, our emotional life is stratified. We experience feelings on four different levels: sensible, vital, psychic (mental), and, at the deepest level, spiritual. There is a second and corresponding hierarchy that concerns values. And there is, finally, a third hierarchy, namely of moral models instantiating these values. Living morally means living in accordance with this value ordering. What is lacking in Chappell’s approach is the idea of a felt hierarchy of values.