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<p>In <i>Epiphanies</i> Sophie-Grace Chappell aims for nothing less than the development of a&#xa0;comprehensive ethics of lived experience. For this ambitious project, Chappell believes she must methodologically forgo philosophical theory in favor of a&#xa0;descriptive, phenomenological approach. However, this renunciation proves insufficiently justified. Even if Chappell’s critique of “moral theory” in the sense of theory-building within normative ethics were valid, it does not address another form of philosophical theorization, namely value theory, which turns out to be far more relevant to Chappell’s project. Through three distinct yet interconnected problem areas, it will be shown that Chappell not only requires such axiological theorization for central arguments and theses in her book but also, in fact, already engages in such theorization to some extent. This applies in particular to the status of a&#xa0;realist ontology of value, to the problem of distinguishing between different kinds of values and determining their interrelations, and finally to the normative demands posed by various kinds of values. Using related arguments from the domain of material ethics of value (<i>materiale Wertethik</i>) as an example of sophisticated axiological theorization within the philosophical movement of early 20th&#xa0;century objective phenomenology, the advantages of explicitly addressing the corresponding axiological commitments and burdens of proof and discussing them, pace Chappell, within a&#xa0;broader theoretical framework will be demonstrated.</p>

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Ethical theory or material ethics of value—Which kind of theory (if any) for an ethics of lived experience?

  • 期刊论文

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年9月30日

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  • Christoph Halbig

摘要

In Epiphanies Sophie-Grace Chappell aims for nothing less than the development of a comprehensive ethics of lived experience. For this ambitious project, Chappell believes she must methodologically forgo philosophical theory in favor of a descriptive, phenomenological approach. However, this renunciation proves insufficiently justified. Even if Chappell’s critique of “moral theory” in the sense of theory-building within normative ethics were valid, it does not address another form of philosophical theorization, namely value theory, which turns out to be far more relevant to Chappell’s project. Through three distinct yet interconnected problem areas, it will be shown that Chappell not only requires such axiological theorization for central arguments and theses in her book but also, in fact, already engages in such theorization to some extent. This applies in particular to the status of a realist ontology of value, to the problem of distinguishing between different kinds of values and determining their interrelations, and finally to the normative demands posed by various kinds of values. Using related arguments from the domain of material ethics of value (materiale Wertethik) as an example of sophisticated axiological theorization within the philosophical movement of early 20th century objective phenomenology, the advantages of explicitly addressing the corresponding axiological commitments and burdens of proof and discussing them, pace Chappell, within a broader theoretical framework will be demonstrated.