Metaethical constructivism and the capacity of practical reason

Since the 1990s, meta-ethical constructivism has established itself as a serious contender in debates about the nature and sources of practical normativity. Roughly, constructivism’s core idea is that practical normativity or normative reasons neither exist independently of what we think and do, nor in virtue of the fact that we want and intend things, but because we engage in some distinctive sort of activity. How exactly to characterize that activity, and how to distinguish constructivism from its main rivals, are, however, contested issues. In this paper, I will suggest that constructivism in meta-ethics is best understood as explaining practical reasons through the possession and habitual exercise of the capacity of practical reason. This characterization offers a neat way of understanding what is at issue between constructivism and its rivals, realism and subjectivism, as well as the differences between important varieties of constructivism. It also promises to help resolve some important problems critics have pointed out for constructivism.