Respect and Using Others Merely as Means.
摘要
This article raises critical questions about Pauline Kleingeld’s interpretation of how one can derive concrete duties from Kant’s Formula of Humanity. Kleingeld has proposed a clear, three-step procedure that can give guidance for a variety of complicated cases. According to her view, to use someone merely as a means, one must (i) use the other person as a causal means to one’s end, (ii) have an attitude of not paying due regard to the patient’s consent, whereby (iii) it is the patient’s genuine, actual consent that is crucial. This article raises several examples that question whether the three conditions are jointly sufficient to make an action morally wrong, and it asks about each condition separately whether it is necessary to violate the first part of Kant’s Formula of Humanity. The examples suggest that Kleingeld’s interpretation is of local importance, but might not be the supreme limiting condition of one’s freedom. The article ends with a brief sketch of an alternative approach.