On the Limits of Actual Consent

This comment discusses Pauline Kleingeld’s account of what Kant meant by “using another person as a mere means”. Kleingeld defends an “agent focused” account of consent, according to which what is required to make the use permissible is not only the actual consent of the person being used, but also the agent’s inclusion of the person’s actual consent as a limiting condition in their maxim. My comment is based on the observation that one can actually consent to being used as a mere means, so that actual consent (even if included in the agent’s maxim as a limiting condition) cannot be sufficient to make the use permissible. While Kleingeld acknowledges this problem by introducing normative conditions for consent, I want to draw attention to the source of the problem: actual consent is not necessarily an expression of the person’s humanity (rational nature), which is the value that the formula of humanity requires to be protected. I explore the consequences of the fact that respect for a person’s humanity and actual consent can diverge. It seems that the normative role of consent cannot be understood independently of a grasp of our standing as beings with a rational nature.