Zur Funktion der „kleinen“ Rache in Prozessen moralischer Wiederherstellung – Warum Verzeihen und Rache nicht immer Gegensätze sind

Starting from the observation that revenge is today either completely ignored in philosophy or equated with its excessively violent forms and morally condemned, this essay aims to sketch a more nuanced picture of revenge and to criticise the idea that revenge and forgiveness are mutually exclusive opposites in social reality. In the first part, drawing on recent philosophical criticism, I argue against an essentialist and idealised understanding of forgiveness. I then argue that the evaluation of forgiveness and revenge should also take into account their respective roles in maintaining or redressing unequal power relations and their function in the self-empowerment of victims of abuse and the restoration of their self-respect. In the final section, I use three examples to show that a process of moral repair often needs to integrate small elements of revenge in order to make forgiveness possible.