<p>In the digital age, where human experience is increasingly shaped by algorithms, some scholars have appealed to Clark and Chalmers’s Extended Mind hypothesis to account for human–algorithm relations. These accounts suggest that algorithmically generated content functions as an extension of human cognition. This paper argues that while certain forms of online cognition may indeed be extended—either literally, by adhering to the core criteria of Clark and Chalmers’s thesis, or metaphorically, by satisfying only some of them—algorithmic systems violate key principles of the Extended Mind hypothesis. Drawing on post-humanist insights and AI literature, the paper shows that algorithms do not merely support or extend preexisting cognitive processes and beliefs. Rather, they often impose content based on past usage that leads to transformations of preexisting beliefs or to the formation of new ones. By contrasting stable analogue media, such as the notebook in Clark and Chalmers’s canonical example, with the dynamic and adaptive nature of contemporary algorithmic systems, the paper proposes a cognitive spectrum of human-technology relations, ranging from genuine cases of cognitive extension to cases of cognitive entanglement in which algorithmic agency influences the human user to such an extent that it nearly supervenes on their cognition.</p>