We analyzed water pollution in the Ganges River caused by tanneries in Kanpur, India. Specifically, we examined the merits of a claim made recently in the literature that unitizing or merging polluting tanneries can improve water quality in the Ganges. We modeled the \(n\ge 2\) polluting tanneries in Kanpur as a Cournot oligopoly and derived the equilibrium output of leather, profits, and social welfare. Second, we permitted \(m<n\) tanneries to merge and determined when the \(m\) -tannery unitization is profitable to the unitized entity. Third, the \((n-m)\) non-unitized tanneries were better off with unitization. Finally, our findings demonstrated that \(m\) -tannery unitization increases the industry price of leather and lowers social welfare. In conclusion, we discuss the implications of these findings for improved water quality in the Ganges.
