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<p>With the extensive usage of IoT devices in the present era, security in such devices is of paramount importance. These devices are designed to operate in resource-constrained environments. Such devices require energy-efficient and compact encryption algorithms, such as GIFT cipher. The relaxed fault model of Persistent fault analysis (PFA) attack renders the cipher vulnerable to fault-based side-channel analysis, thus breaching the security of IoT devices operating in environment exposed to adversaries. Thus, PFA attacks have drawn particular attention from the research community. In this work, we present a PFA attack to recover the complete 128-bit master key for both versions of GIFT cipher. We also propose two novel algorithms, namely, PFA16-v1 and PFA16-v2, which reduce the number of queries required for key recovery by over 20X. In the optimal case of PFA16-v2, the required queries are reduced to 128.95 and 43.31 on average for GIFT-64 and GIFT-128, respectively. Finally, we propose an infection-based countermeasure that can protect cryptographic implementations against the proposed algorithms of PFA on both GIFT-64 and GIFT-128.</p>

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Revisiting Persistent Fault Analysis on GIFT Lightweight Cipher

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月11日

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  • Kalpit Kothari,
  • Arjit Arora,
  • Bodhisatwa Mazumdar

摘要

With the extensive usage of IoT devices in the present era, security in such devices is of paramount importance. These devices are designed to operate in resource-constrained environments. Such devices require energy-efficient and compact encryption algorithms, such as GIFT cipher. The relaxed fault model of Persistent fault analysis (PFA) attack renders the cipher vulnerable to fault-based side-channel analysis, thus breaching the security of IoT devices operating in environment exposed to adversaries. Thus, PFA attacks have drawn particular attention from the research community. In this work, we present a PFA attack to recover the complete 128-bit master key for both versions of GIFT cipher. We also propose two novel algorithms, namely, PFA16-v1 and PFA16-v2, which reduce the number of queries required for key recovery by over 20X. In the optimal case of PFA16-v2, the required queries are reduced to 128.95 and 43.31 on average for GIFT-64 and GIFT-128, respectively. Finally, we propose an infection-based countermeasure that can protect cryptographic implementations against the proposed algorithms of PFA on both GIFT-64 and GIFT-128.