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<p>A&#xa0;decade after the Brexit referendum, the EU and the United Kingdom remain locked in an unwanted but resilient post-Brexit settlement. This article analyses how the hard Brexit choices made between 2017 and 2020 culminated in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, leaving the UK outside the single market and customs union and limiting institutionalised cooperation with the EU. By 2026, the economic and political costs of this model are widely recognised, and British public opinion has shifted against Brexit. Nevertheless, the article argues that a&#xa0;fundamental reversal remains unlikely. The Labour government’s reset has improved the atmosphere and delivered selective advances, notably in security and defence cooperation and Erasmus+, but it has not challenged the core red lines inherited from the Johnson settlement. At the same time, the EU remains reluctant to grant the UK bespoke access to parts of the single market. In addition, while UK politics is fragmenting, even Labour is reluctant to challenge the remaining pro-Brexit voters with Reform UK leading in the polls. The result is a&#xa0;path-dependent equilibrium: politically unsatisfactory, economically costly, but difficult for either side to escape.</p>

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An unwanted equilibrium: The EU-UK relations ten years after the Brexit referendum

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月22日

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  • Nicolai von Ondarza

摘要

A decade after the Brexit referendum, the EU and the United Kingdom remain locked in an unwanted but resilient post-Brexit settlement. This article analyses how the hard Brexit choices made between 2017 and 2020 culminated in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, leaving the UK outside the single market and customs union and limiting institutionalised cooperation with the EU. By 2026, the economic and political costs of this model are widely recognised, and British public opinion has shifted against Brexit. Nevertheless, the article argues that a fundamental reversal remains unlikely. The Labour government’s reset has improved the atmosphere and delivered selective advances, notably in security and defence cooperation and Erasmus+, but it has not challenged the core red lines inherited from the Johnson settlement. At the same time, the EU remains reluctant to grant the UK bespoke access to parts of the single market. In addition, while UK politics is fragmenting, even Labour is reluctant to challenge the remaining pro-Brexit voters with Reform UK leading in the polls. The result is a path-dependent equilibrium: politically unsatisfactory, economically costly, but difficult for either side to escape.