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<p>Governance at the state level in Germany is increasingly complex, with notable implications for federal politics under cooperative federalism. Government formation following state elections has become more challenging due to growing party pluralism, social polarization, and the fragmentation of parliaments. As a&#xa0;result, cross-camp multiparty coalitions have become more common, often reducing governance to the lowest common denominator. At the same time, the legislative authority of the Länder is comparatively limited; a&#xa0;main responsibility and function lies in implementing a&#xa0;large share of federal legislation. This raises the question of whether the current parliamentary system—based on adversarial party competition—is still appropriate, or whether a&#xa0;consensus-oriented model might suit better for contemporary governance challenges. One possible reform is the direct election of state premiers, while maintaining the parliamentary vote of no confidence. In this model, unclear majorities in parliament would no longer hinder the government formation process. The risk of frequent no-confidence votes would be mitigated by requiring a&#xa0;qualified majority and linking them to parliamentary dissolution. A&#xa0;directly elected premier would initially govern without a&#xa0;set parliamentary majority, but could seek cooperation based on variable, issue-based coalitions. Unlike traditional minority governments, such an administration would take office immediately after the election and would not face an initial investiture vote, thus avoiding vulnerability to intra-party/-coalition dissent.</p>

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Direktwahl der Ministerpräsidenten: Ein Reformvorschlag zum flexibleren Regieren in den Ländern

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

    开放获取

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月2日

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  • Mahir Tokatlı

摘要

Governance at the state level in Germany is increasingly complex, with notable implications for federal politics under cooperative federalism. Government formation following state elections has become more challenging due to growing party pluralism, social polarization, and the fragmentation of parliaments. As a result, cross-camp multiparty coalitions have become more common, often reducing governance to the lowest common denominator. At the same time, the legislative authority of the Länder is comparatively limited; a main responsibility and function lies in implementing a large share of federal legislation. This raises the question of whether the current parliamentary system—based on adversarial party competition—is still appropriate, or whether a consensus-oriented model might suit better for contemporary governance challenges. One possible reform is the direct election of state premiers, while maintaining the parliamentary vote of no confidence. In this model, unclear majorities in parliament would no longer hinder the government formation process. The risk of frequent no-confidence votes would be mitigated by requiring a qualified majority and linking them to parliamentary dissolution. A directly elected premier would initially govern without a set parliamentary majority, but could seek cooperation based on variable, issue-based coalitions. Unlike traditional minority governments, such an administration would take office immediately after the election and would not face an initial investiture vote, thus avoiding vulnerability to intra-party/-coalition dissent.