<p>Albania has recently undergone significant transformations in its judicial governance. In light of the interest of external actors in tackling the corruption and organised crime that is evident in the current judiciary, Albania has chosen to include ‘international’ actors by giving them a role in judiciary decision making. Constitutionally established commissions composed of and monitored by international actors have been assigned to manage and oversee the process of the appointment and dismissal of judges and prosecutors. Although prevailing approaches to state-building and to judiciary governance have continued to follow Weberian paradigms, which characterise the state by its monopoly over the judicial authority, Albania’s new approach has been fundamentally at variance with the underlying Weberian approach. This article examines the complex mix of national and international dynamics and interests that were combined to produce a hybrid regime in the judiciary of Albania. I use the recent judiciary reform in Albania to illustrate how domestic judiciary reforms were merged with the strategic interests of external actors, leading to the emergence of a hybrid form of judiciary governance. Furthermore, this article discusses how attempts to reform a particular sector have combined national and international interests. In addition, this article shows how domestic actors helped to legitimise the strategic interests of external actors. This analysis intends to reveal that institutional outcomes are ongoing and are shaped through continuous negotiations between nationals and internationals.</p>