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<p>Economists typically model power through prices or outside-option wedges. This paper develops a formal model in which economic power operates instead through control over the feasible set of economic choices. Political scientists have long understood power as control over feasibility—the ability to determine which markets and technologies remain accessible. This paper formalizes power as control over the domain of economic choice. Economic coercion is modeled as a conditional restriction on the set of feasible inputs. When inputs exhibit complementarity—low elasticity of substitution—access restrictions generate large output losses, forcing compliance by eliminating alternatives rather than through price adjustment. Vulnerability depends on technological structure, not trade volume: an economy importing 2% of GDP can be highly exposed if those inputs are non-substitutable. Approaches that assume fixed feasibility tend to conflate trade intensity with technological dependence and to model compliance as marginal adjustment rather than as a cross-regime comparison. The framework provides a formal foundation for analyzing feasibility-based power in the international political economy.</p>

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The Price is Not Right: Economic Power as Control Over Feasibility in International Political Economy

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  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月25日

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  • Dwayne Woods

摘要

Economists typically model power through prices or outside-option wedges. This paper develops a formal model in which economic power operates instead through control over the feasible set of economic choices. Political scientists have long understood power as control over feasibility—the ability to determine which markets and technologies remain accessible. This paper formalizes power as control over the domain of economic choice. Economic coercion is modeled as a conditional restriction on the set of feasible inputs. When inputs exhibit complementarity—low elasticity of substitution—access restrictions generate large output losses, forcing compliance by eliminating alternatives rather than through price adjustment. Vulnerability depends on technological structure, not trade volume: an economy importing 2% of GDP can be highly exposed if those inputs are non-substitutable. Approaches that assume fixed feasibility tend to conflate trade intensity with technological dependence and to model compliance as marginal adjustment rather than as a cross-regime comparison. The framework provides a formal foundation for analyzing feasibility-based power in the international political economy.