<p>By identifying a leader’s primary motive to stay in power, multiple theories, such as selectorate theory, democratic peace theory, and diversionary use of force theory, have treated leader rationality as a static, background condition. In contrast, this study conceptualizes rationality as a variable and directly links it with structural factors. By incorporating insights from both diversionary use of force theory and neoclassical realism, we delineate the extended motivations of a rational political leader. In our account, the leader’s choices regarding international conflicts are driven not only by the motive to stay in power, but also by the goals of enhancing national cohesion and increasing the state’s power and prestige. In this study, we utilized Generalized Linear Models (GLM) to analyze quarterly time series data, for the United States from 1990 to 2017. Our results offer a nuanced understanding of diversionary use of force theory and neoclassical realism. We found that, under structural conditions, such as leader’s approval ratings, economic inequality, and GDP growth, leader rationality does influence international conflicts. These results generally support our argument about the expanded nature of leaders’ motives. Leaders seek international conflicts both to enhance the state’s power and prestige and to achieve domestic cohesion. If these objectives are met, rational leaders can expect to secure their political survival and increase their personal power.</p>